In this paper, we proposed a new attack against Hwang et al.'s cryptosystem. This cryptosystem uses a super-increasing sequence as private key and the authors investigate a new algorithm called permutation combination algorithm to enhance density of knapsack to avoid the low-density attack. Sattar J. Aboud [Aboud j. Sattar, "An improved knapsack public key cryptography system", International Journal of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions, Vol.3 (3), pp.310-319, 2011] used Shamir's attack on the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem to break this cryptosystem. Due to use of Lenstera's integer programming, Lagarias showed that Shamir's attack is inefficient in practice; So, Aboud's attack is impractical too.
Introduction
The first knapsack-type public key cryptosystem (PKC) was introduced by Merkle and Hellman [12] . Since its proposal, knapsack-type PKC had been widely studied and many knapsack PKCs were developed. However, almost all knapsack cryptosystems were shown insecure in that they are vulnerable to some known attacks, such as low density attack [2, 8] , orthogonal lattice attack [15] , ... . Nowadays, we reconsider knapsack public key cryptography because Shor [17] showed that integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems can be easily solved by using quantum computers. Therefore, traditional public key cryptosystem based on the two problems cannot be used to provide privacy protections any longer and public key cryptosystems secure in quantum computing environments are needed to be developed. The knapsack problem is NP-complete [14] . Hence, we can design cryptosystems based on the knapsack problem in order to resist quantum attacks. On the other hand, although the underlying problem is NP-complete, but some of the knapsack cryptosystems such as Merkle-Hellman [16] , Chor-Rivest [18] , was broken due to the special structure of the private key and the mathematical way that public key (public knapsack) was built from the private key.
M. S. Hwang et al. [6] introduced a new knapsack type public key cryptosystem in 2009. This cryptosystem is based on basic Merkel-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem [12] and uses a super-increasing sequence as private key. They investigate a new algorithm called permutation combination algorithm. By exploiting this algorithm, the authors attempted to enhance density of knapsack to avoid the low-density attack. Hwang et al. knapsack-type cryptosystem was attacked by Aboud [1] . Aboud's attack is based on Shamir's attack [16] on the basic MerkleHellman cryptosystem. Lagarias [9] showed due to use of Lenstera's integer programming, Shamir's attack is inefficient in practice, so, Aboud's attack is not practicable.
In this paper, we use LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm for analysis Hwang et al.'s knapsack-type cryptosystem. The LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm is a crucial component in many number-theoretic algorithms. It is useful for solving certain knapsack (subset sum) problems, and has been used for cryptanalyzeing public-key encryption schemes which are based on the subset sum problem. We show that because of the special structure in the key generation stage, we can use the LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm for cryptanalyzeing Hwang et al.'s cryptosystem and obtain equivalent private keys (superincreasing sequences).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we briefly explain some mathematical background. These concepts are useful for understanding the security analysis of the Hwang et al.'s cryptosystem. Then, in Section 3, we review Hwang et al.'s knapsack cryptosystem. New cryptanalysis of this cryptosystem will be discussed in Section 4 and in section 5, we compute the computational complexity of the proposed attack.
Mathematical Background
In this section, we recall some concepts about the subsetsum problem and lattice theory. These concepts are useful to understand the security analysis of the Hwang et al. ' 
The Subset sum problem is a particular case of the 0-1 knapsack problem. The subset sum problem has been proven to be NP-complete. The computational version of the subset sum problem is NP-hard [13] . 
Definition2. (super-increasing sequence
Knapsack public-key encryption schemes are based on the subset sum problem, which is NP-complete. The basic idea is to select an instance of the subset sum problem that is easy to solve, and then to disguise it as an instance of the general subset sum problem which is hopefully difficult to solve. The original knapsack set can serve as the private key, while the transformed knapsack set serves as the public key. . 
Definition3. Let
The basis {݂ ଵ , ݂ ଶ , … , ݂ } is said to be reduced (more precisely, Lovász-reduced) if
(where หߤ , ห denotes the absolute value of ߤ , ), and
The LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm is a crucial component in many number-theoretic algorithms such as simultaneous Diophantine approximation Problem. It is useful for solving certain subset sum problems, and has been used for cryptanalyzeing public-key encryption schemes which are based on the subset sum problem. OUTPUT: a reduced basis for ‫.ܮ‬ 1.
2.
For ݅ from 2 to ݊ do the following: 2.1
4.
Execute subroutine ‫,݇(ܦܧܴ‬ ݇ − 1) to possibly update some ߤ , .
5.
If 
For
݅ = ݇ + 1, ݇ + 2, … , ݊: Set ‫ݐ‬ ← ߤ , , ߤ , ← ߤ ,ିଵ − ‫,ݐߤ‬ and ߤ ,ିଵ ← t + μ ୩,୩ିଵ − μ ୧,୩ . 5.5 ݇ ← ‫ݔܽ݉‬ (2, ݇ − 1).
Go to step 4.
Otherwise, for ݈ = ݇ − 2, ݇ − 3, … , 1, execute ‫,݇(ܦܧܴ‬ ݈), and finally set ݇ ← ݇ + 1.
6.
If ݇ ≤ ݊ then go to step 4. Otherwise, return
If หߤ , ห > 1/2 then do the following: 1.
2.
For ݆ from 1 to ݈ − 1, set ߤ , ← ߤ , − ‫ߤݎ‬ , .
3.
The LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm is a polynomialtime algorithm for finding a reduced basis, given a basis for a lattice. A major application of algorithm2 is to give an algorithm to compute the integers ‫,ݍ(‬ ‫‬ ଵ , … , ‫‬ ) in Definition8. In practice, the real numbers ܽ ଵ , ܽ ଶ , … , ܽ are given to some decimal precision (and so are rational numbers with coefficients of some size). The size of an instance of the simultaneous Diophantine approximation is the sum of the bit lengths of the numerator and denominator of the given approximations to the ܽ , together with the bit length of the representation of ߝ and ܳ. Let ܺ be a bound on the absolute value of all numerators and denominators of the ܽ .The computational task is to find a solution ‫,ݍ(‬ ‫‬ ଵ , … , ‫‬ ) in time which is polynomial in ݊, log(ܺ), log(1/ߝ) and log Q. The LLL algorithm applied to ‫,ܮ‬ outputs a non-zero vector
If ‫ݒ‬ is the smallest vector found by the LLL-algorithm, then from definition7, we have
By multiplying together the ݊ + 1 above inequality, we have
From lemma 1, we know that ‫)ܮ(ݐ݁݀‬ = ∏ |݂ * | ୀଵ and so
If ‫ݍ‬ = 0 then ‫ݒ‬ = (0, ‫−‬ ଵ , ‫−‬ ଶ , … , ‫−‬ ) with some ‫‬ ≠ 0 and so ‫‖ݒ‖‬ ≥ 1, hence ‫ݍ‬ ≠ 0. Without loss of generality, ‫ݍ‬ > 0 . Since ‫‖ݒ‖‬ ∞ ≤ ‫‖ݒ‖‬ and ‫‖ݒ‖‬ < ߳ < 1 it follows that ‫ܳ/߳ݍ‬ < ߳ < 1 (where ‫‖ݒ‖‬ ∞ = ‫ܳ/߳ݍ‬ = ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ) and so
Similarly, for other ‫ݒ‬ , 2 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊ we have ‫ܽݍ|‬ − ‫‬ | ≤ ߳ and so They presented a permutation combination algorithm and used this algorithm to ensure the security of the cryptosystem. By exploiting this algorithm, they attempted to enhance density of knapsack to avoid the low-density attack [2, 8] . The permutation algorithm is as follows: 1. Define an original sequence
2. Recombine all the elements of the original sequence ‫ܦ‬ which obtain (݊! − 1) sequences ‫ܦ‬ ଵ , . . . , ‫ܦ‬ (!ିଵ) . The sequences ‫ܦ‬ (݅ = 1, 2, … , ݊! − 1) are defined as follows:
Suppose we can compute ‫ܦ‬ for 1 ≤ ݉ ≤ ݊! − 1.
݉ can be written as
Each sequence has an own corresponding value called the factorial carry value, ‫ݑ{‬ , ‫ݑ‬ ିଵ , … . , ‫ݑ‬ ଶ , ‫ݑ‬ ଵ } . Using the factorial carry value, we can efficiently obtain any sequence with the following algorithm. OUTPUT: 
The ciphertext is ‫ܥ‬ = ‫ܥ{‬ ଵ , . . . , ‫ܥ‬ } and sends ‫,ܥ(‬ ‫ܦ‬ ᇱ ) to the receiver.
Decryption:
Receiver after receiving ‫,ܥ(‬ ‫ܦ‬ ᇱ ) , executes the following steps to derive ‫ܯ‬ from ‫ܥ‬ and ‫:′ܦ‬ 
Hence, the receiver can solves these super-increasing knapsack problems with algorithm1 and obtains ‫ݔ‬ , for 1 ≤ ݅ ≤ 1024 and 1 ≤ ݇ ≤ ݆ . Therefore, we can recover original message ‫ܯ‬ = ‫ܯ{‬ ଵ , ‫ܯ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ܯ‬ } where ‫ܯ‬ = ‫ݔ{‬ ,ଵ , … , ‫ݔ‬ ,ଵଶସ }.
Aboud attacked this cryptosystem by using Shamir's attack [16] on the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem. As we said, Lagarias in [9] showed Shamir's attack is inefficient in practice, so Aboud's attack is not practicable.
Our Proposed Attack
In this section, we present our attack against the Hwang et al.'s knapsack cryptosystem. The first step in the attack is noticing that the given knapsack problem ܿ = ∑ ܽ ݉ ୀଵ (with public weights (ܽ ଵ , ܽ ଶ , . . . , ܽ ) and target ܿ) can be transformed into infinitely many different easy knapsack problems with super-increasing weights (ܽ′ ଵ , ܽ′ ଶ , . . . , ܽ′ ) and target ܿ′. This was independently observed by Eier-Lagger [4] and Desmedt-Vanderwalle-Govaerts [3] . Their result can be summarized in the following lemma. Our attack consists of three steps: in step1, we can use LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm for finding a superincreasing sequence ‫′ܤ‬ = (ܾ′ ଵ , ܾ′ ଶ , … , ܾ′ ଵଷ ) that is very close to super-increasing sequence ‫ܤ‬ = (ܾ ଵ , ܾ ଶ , … , ܾ ୬ ). In step2 and step3 we use super-increasing sequence ‫ܤ‬ ′ = (ܾ′ ଵ , ܾ′ ଶ , … , ܾ′ ଵଷ ) and public ciphertext ‫,ܥ(‬ ‫ܦ‬ ′ ) for recover the plaintext.
Step1:
In the general form, equation (1) can be written as follows:
Where (ܽ ଵ , ܽ ଶ , … , ܽ ) is the public key and (ܾ ଵ , ܾ ଶ , … , ܾ ) is the private key. Let ܷ = ‫ݓ‬ ିଵ ‫݀݉‬ ‫‬ where 1 ≤ ܷ < ‫.‬ We have
This means that for 1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊, there exists some integers ݇ such that In particular, the right side of ‫/ܷ‬ − ݇ ଵ /ܽ ଵ < 1/(ܽ ଵ 2 ିଵ ) is very small. Hence, we can assume
From equation (4), If we take ܷ ᇱ = ݇ ଵ and ‫‬ ᇱ = ܽ ଵ , then ‫′/′ܷ‬ is very close to ‫/ܷ‬ and from lemma 2, the positive integers ܾ′ = ܷ′ܽ ‫݀݉‬ ‫‬ ᇱ for 1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊ are a superincreasing sequence (note that ܽ 's are public and obvious). Subtracting the case ݅ = 1 of equation (3) from the ݅-th gives
and so, for 2 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊,
Since ܽ ଵ is public, It remains to compute the integer ݇ ଵ such that equation (5) holds, given only the integers ܽ ଵ , ܽ ଶ , . . . , ܽ . Another way to write equation (5) is
and one sees that the problem is precisely simultaneous Diophantine approximation. From theorem2, We can solve the simultaneous Diophantine approximation in the polynomial time and find a value for ݇ ଵ . We now set ܷ ᇱ = ݇ ଵ and ‫′‬ = ܽ ଵ (note that ܽ ଵ is public) and computes ܾ′ = ܷ′ܽ ‫݀݉‬ ‫′‬ for 1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊ to obtain the sequence (ܾ′ ଵ , ܾ′ ଶ , . . . , ܾ′ ) , as we said this is a super-increasing sequence. We then compute where 0 < ߣ < 1 and 1 < ݈ < ݊. LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm can be applied to the lattice ‫)ܦ(ܮ‬ to output a relatively short vector ‫ݒ‬ = ‫ݒ(‬ 1 , ‫ݒ‬ 2 , … , ‫ݒ‬ ݈ ), which can be used to approximate the simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem. Since ‫ݒ‬ ∈ ‫,)ܦ(ܮ‬ there exist integers ݇ ଵ , ݇ ଶ , … , ݇ such that
where (ܽ ଵ , ܽ ଶ , … , ܽ ) is the public key. After computing ‫ݒ‬ = ‫ݒ(‬ ଵ , ‫ݒ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ݒ‬ ) with LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm, we can compute ݇ ଵ from equation ‫ݒ‬ ଵ = ߣ݇ ଵ .
With the pair (ܷ′, ‫)′‬ = (݇ ଵ , ܽ ଵ ), we now compute integers
which form lemma 2, this is a super-increasing sequence. We can use this sequence in place of to private key (ܾ ଵ , ܾ ଶ , … , ܾ ୬ ).
Step2:
We can eavesdrop public ciphertext ‫,ܥ(‬ ‫ܦ‬ ᇱ ) from insecure channel and hence we can compute factorial carry value ܷ = ‫ݑ{‬ ଵ , ‫ݑ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ݑ‬ ଵ } of ‫′ܦ‬ where
with the following algorithm. 
1.
‫ݎ‬ ← ݉ 2.
Step3:
We divide super-increasing sequence (ܾ′ ଵ , ܾ′ ଶ , … , ܾ′ ) (which is computed in step1) into 8 subset public key vectors: 
Performance Analysis of Attack
As we see in section 4, in step1, we need to find a pair of integers (ܷ′, ‫)′‬ such that ܷ ᇱ ‫′/‬ is very close to ‫/ܷ‬ (where ܷ = ‫ݓ‬ ିଵ ‫݀݉(‬ ‫)‬ and ‫‬ are parts of the private key and (ܽ ଵ , ܽ ଶ , … , ܽ ) is public key). As we showed, we can take ‫′‬ = ܽ ଵ where ܽ ଵ is public. So we need to find a value for ܷ ᇱ = ݇ ଵ . In step2, we can use algorithm4 for find the factorial carry value ܷ = ‫ݑ{‬ ଵ , ‫ݑ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ݑ‬ ଵ } of the public value ‫.′ܦ‬ In step3, we need one modular multiplication for compute ‫′ܥ‬ and (1024 × ݆) subtraction to solve equation (7) with algorithm1 for recover the original message ‫ܯ‬ = ‫ܯ{‬ ଵ , ‫ܯ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ܯ‬ } from any challenge ciphertext ‫,ܥ(‬ ‫ܦ‬ ᇱ ).
Hence, the more difficult and important part of attack is step1. In step1, we used simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem for finding the value of ܷ ᇱ = ݇ ଵ . So we need to compute the computational complexity of simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem. complexity of this problem is given in theorem3 where take ܱ(݊ ‫݊{ݔܽ݉‬ ‫,)ܺ(݈݃‬ ݊ ଶ + ݊ ‫})߳/1(݈݃‬ ଷ ) bit operations, which is polynomial time. Consequently, the proposed attack is polynomial time and practicable.
